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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TYLER JOHN KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45731
Kootenai County Case No. CR 201713933

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Kelley failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
imposed concurrent unified sentence of 30 years with four years determinate upon his convictions
for sexual battery with a child age 16 or 17 and lewd conduct with a child under the age of 16?
ARGUMENT
Kelley Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Tyler John Kelley met and engaged in sexual communications with underage girls through

the internet. (Confidential documents, pp. 22-23; R., pp. 19-33.) He had multiple incidents of
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sexual intercourse with two of them, aged 17 and 14, respectively, and exchanged explicit
photographs with another. (Confidential documents, pp. 22-23; R., pp. 19-33.)
The state charged Kelley with one count of sexual battery with a child age 16 or 17, one
count of lewd conduct with a child under the age of 16, and one count of possession of sexually
exploitative material. (R., pp. 97-98.) Pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to sexual battery
and lewd conduct, and the state dismissed the possession of exploitative materials charge. (R., pp.
112, 114; Tr., p. 4, L. 20 – p. 5, L. 5; p. 13, L. 21 – p. 14, L. 11.) The district court imposed
concurrent sentences of 30 years with four years determinate on each conviction. (Tr., p. 39, L.
25 – p. 40, L. 17.)
Kelley contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion by “fail[ing] to give
proper weight and consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in this case.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 4.) Application of the correct legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
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and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

Kelley Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the
period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals
of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392 P.3d at 1236–37
(quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court found that Kelley was a sexual predator. (Tr., p. 40, L. 23 – p. 41, L. 5.)
The district court further found that, in relation to his two underage victims in this case, that what
he did was “predatory,” that he engaged in “grooming” whereby he took advantage of the victim’s
having difficulty with depression, putting himself out as a friend when he was really grooming
them for sex. (Tr., p. 41, L. 14-21.) All Kelley “cared about” was satisfying his own sexual or
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emotional needs. (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 21-24.) The district court had “zero confidence” that in the next
six to eight months Kelley could be rehabilitated to the point he was an “acceptable risk to be
supervised out in public.” (Tr., p. 41, L. 25 – p. 42, L. 4.) The district court stated that four years
in custody were necessary, and then the parole commission would have a long indeterminate time
to supervise him once he was released. (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 7-18.) These findings support the district
court’s exercise of discretion.
Without mentioning the district court’s findings or analysis, Kelley asserts the district court
erred by “fail[ing] to give proper weight and consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in
[this] case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Review of the record under the applicable legal standards
shows that Kelley has failed to show error by the district court.
Kelley first argues that the district court “failed to give proper weight and consideration to
his mental health concerns” and his “difficult childhood.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) He points
to evidence in the record of Kelley’s history of mental health issues and of his having been abused
as a foster child. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.) He ignores, however, the district court’s specific
findings on these matters. The district court specifically found that Kelley has had “mental health
issues” and discussed how those could be addressed in the prison system such that Kelley would
be able to get parole at the earliest opportunity. (Tr., p. 43, L. 19 – p. 44, L. 7.) He also addressed
the fact that Kelley had himself been a victim, but found that “cuts both ways.” (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 1619.) The prior abuse maybe “explains” Kelley’s decision to abuse others, but it does not “excuse”
that behavior. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 20-21.) To the contrary, it made Kelley aware of the long-term
damage he was doing by victimizing others. (Tr., p. 44, L. 21 – p. 45, L. 3.) Kelley’s argument is
based on simply ignoring the court’s actual findings, an argument that therefore cannot show error.
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Kelley also points out his lack of prior criminal convictions, his service in the army, and
his expression of remorse but again outright ignores the court’s comments. (Appellant’s brief, p.
5.) The district court’s sentencing was based primarily upon Kelley’s danger to the community,
which could not be ameliorated in the short-term by treatment. (Tr., p. 41, L. 14 – p. 42, L. 19.)
That Kelley did not have prior convictions and expressed remorse for what he had done did not
mitigate the danger he posed. Likewise, part of his prior history was facing an adultery charge in
the military, which did not cause him to change his behaviors. (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 5-13.) Again, Kelley
cannot show error by ignoring the district court’s relevant factual findings.
The district court imposed a sentence well within its discretion. Kelley has failed to show
error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 27th day of November, 2018.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of November, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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